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Modern War and Modern Law1
David Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
Many thanks. It is a pleasure to be here and I would like to
thank you for the opportunity.
The wars of my time and my country-the America of the
"postwar" half century-have been varied. We have fought a
coid war, postcolonial wars, and innumerable metaphoric wars
on things like "poverty" and "drugs." Our military has
intervened here and there for various humanitarian and
strategic reasons. The current war on terror partakes of all
these. When framed as a clash of civilizations or modes of life-
secular and fundamentalist, Christian and Muslim, modern and
primitive-the war on terror is reminiscent of the Cold War.
Like the Cold War, the war on terror seems greater than
the specific conflicts fought in its name. It transcends the clash
of arms in Iraq or Afghanistan. On their own, those wars
resemble postcolonial and anticolonial conflicts from Algeria to
Vietnam. When we link the war in Afghanistan to women's
rights or the war in Iraq to the establishment of democracy, we
evoke the history of military deployment for humanitarian ends.
In our broader political culture, the phrase "war on terror"
echoes the wars on drugs and poverty as the signal of an
administration's political energy and focus. At the same time,
the technological asymmetries of battling suicide bombers with
precision guided missiles and satellite tracking has made this
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war on terror seem something new-as has the amorphous
nature of the enemy: dispersed, loosely coordinated groups of
people or individuals imitating one another, spurring each other
to action, within the most and the least developed societies
alike.
Strictly speaking, of course, terror is a tactic, not an enemy.
The word is a way of stigmatizing the use of deadly force for
political objectives by non-state actors of which one does not
approve. When we say we are fighting a "war on terror," we not
only disparage the tactic and those who use it-we also
condense all these recollections of prior wars in a single term,
situating this struggle in our own recent history of warfare. The
phrase frames our broader project with fear and marks our
larger purpose as that of reason against unreason, principle
against passion, the sanity of our commercial present against
the irrationality of an imaginary past. In this picture, we
defend civilization itself against what came before, what stands
outside, and what, if we are not vigilant, may well come after.
It is not novel to frame a war in the rhetoric of distinction-
us versus them, good versus evil-nor to evoke a nation's history
of warfare each time its soldiers are again deployed. When the
American administration calls what we are doing "war," they
mean to stress its discontinuity from the normal routines of
peacetime. War is different. To go to war means that a decision
has been taken: the soldier has triumphed over the peacemaker,
the sword over the pen, the party of war over the party of peace.
Differences among us are now to be set aside, along with the
normal budgetary constraints of peacetime. This is serious and
important-a time of extraordinary powers and political
deference, of sacrifice and national purpose.
Increasingly, these distinctions-war and peace, civilian
and combatant, terror and crime-have come to be written in
legal terms. And they are coming unglued. War and peace are
far more continuous with one another than our rhetorical habits
would suggest. Should we have responded to September 11th as
an attack-or as a terrible crime? Are the prisoners at
Guantanamo enemy combatants, criminals, or something
altogether different? These are partly questions of tactic and
strategy, about the appropriate balance between our criminal
justice system and our military in the struggle to make the
United States secure. But these are also questions of political
and legal interpretation. We can imagine a spectrum of
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positions, from insistence that the country remain on a war
footing, at home and abroad, to the view that we treat the
problem of suicide bombing or terrorist attacks as a routine cost
of doing business, a risk to be managed, a crime to be prevented
or aggressively prosecuted. The boundary between war and
peace, or terror and crime, has become something we argue
about as much or more than something we cross. Law has built
practical and rhetorical bridges between war and peace, just as
it has become the rhetoric through which we debate and assert
the boundaries of warfare.
This afternoon, I'd like to step back from these immediate
controversies, to explore three ideas.
First, modern war as a legal institution. Law has crept into
the war machine. The battlespace is as legally regulated as the
rest of modern life. Once a bit player in military conflict, law
now shapes the institutional, logistical and physical landscape
of war. No longer standing outside judging and channeling the
use of force, law has infiltrated the military profession, and
become-for parties on all sides of even the most asymmetric
confrontations-a political and ethical vocabulary for marking
legitimate power and justifiable death.
Second, the surprising fluidity of modern law.
International law is no longer an affair of clear rules and sharp
distinctions. Law today rarely speaks clearly, or with a single
voice. Its influence is subtle, its rules plural. Legality is almost
always a matter of more or less-and legal legitimacy is in the
eye of the beholder. Indeed, as law became an ever more
important yardstick for legitimacy, legal categories became far
too spongy to permit clear resolution of the most important
questions-or became spongy enough to undergird the
experience of self-confident outrage by parties on all sides of a
conflict.
And third, I would like to explore the opportunities and
dangers opened up by this strange partnership of modern war
and modem law. There are new strategic possibilities for both
military professionals and for humanitarians seeking to limit
the violence of warfare. When things go well, law can provide a
framework for talking across cultures about the justice and
efficacy of wartime violence. More often, I am afraid, the
modern partnership of war and law leaves all parties feeling
their cause is just and no one feeling responsible for the deaths
and suffering of war. Good legal arguments can make people
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lose their moral compass and sense of responsibility for the
violence of war
MODERN WAR AS A LEGAL INSTITUTION
It is now commonplace to observe that the Second World
War-a "total" war, in which the great powers mobilized vast
armies and applied the full industrial and economic resources of
their respective nations to the defeat and occupation of enemy
states-is no longer the prototype. Experts differ about what is
most significant in the wars that have followed.
Wars are rarely fought between equivalent nations or
coalitions of great industrial powers. They occur at the
peripheries of the world system, among foes with wildly
different institutional, economic, and military capacities. The
military trains for tasks far from conventional combat: local
diplomacy, intelligence gathering, humanitarian reconstruction,
urban policing, or managing the routine tasks of local
government. It is ever less clear where the war begins and
ends-or which activities are combat, which "peacebuilding."
Enemies are dispersed and decisive engagement is rare.
Battle is at once intensely local and global in new ways.
Violence follows patterns more familiar from epidemiology or
cultural fashion than military strategy. Networks of fellow
travelers exploit the infrastructures of the global economy to
bring force to bear here and there. Satellite systems guide
precision munitions from deep in Missouri to the outskirts of
Kabul. The political, cultural, and diplomatic components of
warfare have become more salient. And, of course, the whole
thing happens in the glare of the modern media.
But what does it mean to say that war has also become a
legal institution-that war is the continuation of law by other
means? Not that everyone always follows the rules-or that
everyone agrees on what the rules are or how they should be
interpreted. But the media coverage of violations and
interpretive differences could throw us off the track-leading us
to underestimate the place of law in modern warfare. After all,
the identification of violations also isolates the bad apples from
the killing law privileges.
Law no longer stands outside conflict, marking its
boundaries or limiting its means. Military operations take place
against a complex tapestry of local and national rules. Laws
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shape the institutional, logistical-even physical-landscape on
which military operations occur. International law has become
the metric for debating the legitimacy of military action. And in
all these ways, law now shapes the politics of war.
War is a legal institution first because it has become a
professional practice. Today's military is linked to the nation's
commercial life, integrated with civilian and peacetime
governmental institutions, and covered by the same national
and international media. Officers discipline their force and
organize their operations with rules.
Some years ago, before the current war in Iraq, I spent
some days on board the USS Independence in the Persian
Gulf-nothing was as striking about the military culture I
encountered there as its intensely regulated feel. Five thousand
sailors, thousands of miles from base, managing complex
technologies and weaponry, constant turnover and flux. It was
absolutely clear that even if I could afford to buy an aircraft
carrier, I couldn't operate it-the carrier, like the military, is a
social system, requiring a complex and entrenched culture of
standard practices and shared experiences-rules and
discipline.
War is a complex organizational endeavor, whose
management places law at the center of military operations.
Law structures logistics, command and control, and the
interface with all the institutions, public and private, that must
be coordinated for military operations to succeed. At least in
principle, no ship moves, no weapon is fired, no target selected
without review for compliance with regulation. This is less the
mark of a military gone soft than the indication that there is
simply no other way to make modern warfare work, internally
or externally. Warfare has become rule and regulation.
Mobilizing "the military" means setting thousands of units
forth in a coordinated way. Branches of the military must be
coordinated. Other departments must be engaged. Public and
private actors must be harnessed to common action. Coalition
partners must be brought into a common endeavor. Delicate
political arrangements and sensibilities must be translated into
practical limits-and authorizations-for using force.
Think back to the negotiations last summer over the UN
force in Lebanon. At issue were the "rules of engagement"-who
could do what, when, to whom? For politicians who will take
the heat, it is important to know just how trigger happy-or
2007]
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"forward leaning"-the soldiers at the tip of the spear will be.
Operating across dozens of jurisdictions, today's military
must comply with innumerable local, national, and
international rules regulating the use of territory, the
mobilization of men, the financing of arms and logistics, and the
deployment of force. If you want to screen banking data in
Belgium, or hire operatives in Pakistan or refuel your plane in
Kazakhstan, you need to know the law of the place.
Baron de Jomini famously defined strategy as "the art of
making war upon the map." Maps are not only representations
of physical terrain-they are also legal constructs. Maps of
powers, jurisdictions, liabilities, rights, and duties.
Law is perhaps most visibly part of military life when it
privileges the killing and destruction of battle. If you kill this
way, and not that, here and not there, these people and not
those-what you do is privileged. If not, it is criminal. And the
war must itself be legal. Domestically, that means within the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.
Internationally, it means in compliance with the UN Charter
and not waged for a forbidden purpose, like "aggression" or
"genocide."
Lawyers have long known that using law is also to invoke
violence-the violence that stands behind legal authority. But
the reverse is also true. To use violence is to invoke the law, the
law that stands behind war, legitimating and permitting
violence.
Battlefield conduct is disciplined by rules: kill soldiers, not
civilians, respect the rights of neutrals. Do not use forbidden
weapons. "Don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes."
Behind the rules stand general principles-no "unnecessary"
damage, any killing or injury must be "proportional" to the
military objective, defend yourself. Together, these principles
have become a global vernacular for assessing the legitimacy of
war, down to the tactics of particular battles. Was the use of
force "necessary" and "proportional" to the military objective-
were the civilian deaths truly "collateral?" Military lawyers
today are often forward deployed with the troops, poring over
planned targets.
The vocabulary of legitimate targeting and proportionate
violence has been internalized by the military. Not every
soldier-not every commander-follows the rules. But this is
less surprising than the fact that people on all sides discuss the
[Vol. 16:2
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legitimacy of battlefield violence in similar legal terms.
This common vernacular has also leached into our political
life. If war remains, as Clausewitz taught us, the continuation
of politics by other means, the politics continued by warfare
today has itself been legalized. The sovereign no longer stands
alone, deciding the fate of empire-he stands rather atop a
complex bureaucracy, exercising powers delegated by a
constitution and shared out with a myriad of agencies,
bureaucracies, and private actors, knit together in complex
networks that spread across borders. Even in the most powerful
and well-integrated states, power today lies in the capillaries of
social and economic life.
To say that the Pentagon reports to the President as
Commander in Chief is a plausible, if oversimplified, description
of the organizational chart. But it is not a good description of
Washington, D.C. There are the intelligence agencies, the
President's own staff, the political consultants, and focus
groups. Born alone, die alone, perhaps-but sovereigns do not
decide alone. The bureaucracies resist, the courts resist, the
dead weight of inertia must be overcome.
Political leaders today act in the shadow of a
knowledgeable, demanding, engaged, and institutionally
entrenched national and global elite. As a result, expert
consensus can and does influence the politics of war-consensus,
for example, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or that
American credibility was on the line. The assessments of
background elites are matters of ideological commitment and
professional judgment-they can be incredibly stable, outlasting
one leader after another, like the broad American consensus
about the importance of "containing" the Soviet Union
throughout the Cold War period. But elite opinion can also
change-sometimes quite rapidly. This was clearly visible in
the fallout from the prisoner abuse scandals in the Iraq war.
They affected the political status of forces among elites debating
all manner of broad and narrow issues relation to the conflict
and America's place in the world. Indeed, the global political
system is a fragmented and unsystematic network of
institutions, often only loosely understood or coordinated by
national governments.
Law has become the common vernacular of this dispersed
elite, even as they argue about just what the law permits and
forbids. This is what has led opponents of the Iraq conflict-or
2007]
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Guantanamo-so often to frame their opposition in legal
terms-what you are doing is illegal.
So much for war as a legal institution.
MODERN LAW: ANTIFORMALISM AND LEGAL
PLURALISM
Before considering the opportunities-and dangers-opened
up by the legalization of war, we need to understand two aspects
of modem law: its antiformalism and its pluralism.
First, antiformalism.
Two hundred years ago, international law was rooted in
ethics-to think about the law of war was to meditate on
considerations of right reason and natural justice. One hundred
years ago, law had become far more a matter of formal rules, de-
linked from morality and rooted in sovereign will. At the end of
the nineteenth century, law was proud of its disconnection from
political, economic, and military reality.
Law stood outside the institutions it regulated, offering a
framework of sharp distinctions and formal boundaries. War
and peace were legally distinct, separated by a formal
"declaration of war." For their killing to be privileged, warriors
would need to be identifiable and stay on the battlefield.
Protected persons would need to stay outside the domain of
combat.
In this spirit, lawyers wrote rules distinguishing
combatants from non-combatants, belligerents from neutrals.
As late as 1941, it seemed natural for the United States to begin
a war with a formal declaration, as Congress did in response to
Pearl Harbor. In the lead-up to both world wars, the United
States carefully guarded our formal status as a "neutral" nation
until war was declared. That Japan attacked the United States
without warning-and without declaring war-in violation of
our neutrality was a popular way of expressing outrage at the
surprise attack.
Humanitarian voices supported the legal separation of war
and peace, and often continue to insist on the sharp distinction
between civilian and combatant, just as they emphasize the
ethical and legal distinctiveness of warfare. For good or ill, this
approach is simply no longer realistic. Warfare has changed,
law has changed, and humanitarians have developed new
tactics.
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For the humanitarian, doubt about an external strategy,
sharply distinguishing the virtues of peace from the violence of
war, often begins when we recognize how easily moral clarity
calls forth violence and justifies warfare, just as war can
strengthen moral determination. Indeed, there seems to be
some kind of feedback loop between our ethical convictions and
our use of force. Great moral claims grow stronger when men
and women kill and die in their name, and it is a rare military
campaign today that is not launched for some humanitarian
purpose.
Ethical denunciation gets us into things on which we are
not able to follow through-triggering intervention in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, even Iraq, with humanitarian promises on which it
cannot deliver. It can focus our attention in all the wrong
places. After all, sexually humiliating, even torturing and
killing, prisoners is probably not, ethically speaking, the worst
or most shocking thing that has happened in Iraq-yet the law
of war focuses our outrage there.
We know that formal rules can often get taken too far. Is it
sensible, for example, to clear the cave with a firebomb because
tear gas, lawful when policing, is unlawful in "combat?"
Absolute rules lead us to imagine we know what violence is just,
what unjust, always and for everyone. But justice is not like
that. It must be imagined, built by people, struggled for, and
redefined, in each conflict in new ways. Justice requires
leadership-on the battlefield and off.
For all these reasons, humanitarians also tried to get inside
the thinking of the military profession. The International
Committee of the Red Cross has always prided itself on its
pragmatic relationship with military professionals. It is not
unusual to hear military lawyers speak of the ICRC lawyers as
their "partners" in codification-and compliance-and vice
versa. They attend the same conferences, and speak the same
language-even when they differ on this or that detail. As
external expressions of virtue became internal expressions of
professional discipline, formal distinctions gave way to more
flexible and pragmatic standards of judgment.
ICRC lawyers worked with the military to codify rules the
military could live with-wanted to live with. No exploding
bullets, respect for ambulances and medical personnel dressed
like this, and so forth. Of course, this reliance on military
acquiescence limited what could be achieved-military leaders
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outlaw weapons which they no longer need, which they feel will
be potent tools only for their adversaries, or against which
defense would be too expensive or difficult. Moreover, narrowly
drawn rules permit a great deal-and legitimate what is
permitted.
As a result, the detailed rules of The Hague or Geneva
Conventions were transposed into broad standards-like
"proportionality"-that call for more contextual assessments,
and can be printed on a wallet-sized card for soldiers in the
field. "The means of war are not unlimited," "each use of force
must be necessary"---these have become ethical baselines for a
universal modem civilization.
At the same time, the sharp distinction between war and
peace, the need for a "declaration," and even the legal status of
"neutral," was abandoned. The UN Charter replaces the word
"war" with more nuanced-and vague-terms like
"intervention," "threats to the peace," or the "use of armed
force," which trigger one or another institutional response.
This did not happen in a vacuum-it was part of a
widespread loss of faith in the formal distinctions of classical
legal thought-in the wisdom, as well as the plausibility, of
separating law sharply from politics, or private right sharply
from public power. Indeed, the modem law of force represents a
triumph for grasping the nettle of costs and benefits and
infiltrating the background decision-making of those whom it
would bend to humanitarian ends. The result was a new,
modern law in war.
In this new framework, humanitarians often try to expand
the scope of narrow rules by speaking of them in the broad
language of principles. Military professionals have done the
same thing for other reasons-to ease training through
simplification, to emphasize the importance of judgment by
soldiers and commanders, or simply to cover situations not
included under the formal rules with a consistent practice. For
example, a standard Canadian military manual instructs that
the "spirit and principles" of the international law of armed
conflict apply to non-international conflicts not covered by the
terms of the agreed rules.
It is not just that rules have become principles-we as often
find the reverse. Military lawyers turn broad principles and
nuanced judgments into simple bright line rules of engagement
for soldiers in combat. Humanitarians comb military handbooks
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and government statements of principle, promulgated for all
sorts of purposes, to distill "rules" of customary international
law. The ICRC's recent three volume restatement of the
customary law of armed conflict is a monumental work of
advocacy of just this type.
Law's century-long revolt against formalism has been
successful. More than the sum of the rules, law has become a
vocabulary for political judgment, action, and communication.
At the same time, however, the modern law of armed conflict
has become a confusing mix of distinctions that can melt into air
when we press on them too firmly. "War" has become "self-
defense," "hostilities," "the use of force," "resort to arms," "police
action," "peace enforcement," "peace-making," or "peace-
keeping." It is hard to remember which is which-like "chop,"
"whip," "blend" on the kitchen Cuisinart.
Ours is a law of firm rules and loose exceptions, of
foundational principles and counter-principles. Indeed, law now
offers the rhetorical-and doctrinal-tools to make and unmake
the distinction between war and peace. As a result, the
boundaries of war can now be managed strategically.
Take the difficult question-when does war end? The
answer is not to be found in law or fact, but in strategy.
Declaring the end of hostilities might be a matter of election
theater or military assessment. Just like announcing that there
remains "a long way to go," or that the "insurgency is in its final
throes." We should understand these statements as arguments.
As messages-but also as weapons. Law-legal
categorization-is a communication tool. And communicating
the war is fighting the war.
This is a war, this is an occupation, this is a police action,
this is a security zone. These are insurgents, these are
criminals, these are illegal combatants, and so on. All these are
claims with audiences, made for a reason. Increasingly,
defining the battlefield is not only a matter of deployed force-
but it is also a rhetorical and legal claim.
Law provides a vernacular for making such claims about a
battlespace in which all these things are mixed up together.
Troops in the same city are fighting and policing and building
schools. Restoring water is part of winning the war-the
continuation of combat by other means. Private actors are
everywhere-insurgents who melt into the mosque, armed
soldiers who turn out to work for private contractors. Freedom
2007] 481
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fighters dressed as refugees, special forces operatives dressing
like natives, private contractors dressing like Arnold
Schwarzenegger, and all the civilians running the complex
technology and logistical chains "behind" modern warfare. Who
is calling the shots? At one point apparently the Swiss company
backing up life insurance contracts for private convoy drivers in
Iraq imposed a requirement of additional armed guards if they
were to pay on any claim, slowing the whole operation.
In the confusion, we want to insist on a bright line. For the
military, after all, defining the battlefield defines the privilege
to kill. But aid agencies also want the guys digging the wells to
be seen as humanitarians, not post-conflict combatants-
privileged not to be killed. Defining what is not the battlefield
opens a "space" for humanitarian action.
When we use the law strategically, we change it. The Red
Cross changes it. Al Jazeera changes it. CNN changes it-and
the U.S. administration changes it. Humanitarians who seize
on vivid images of civilian casualties to raise expectations about
the accuracy of targeting are changing the legal fabric. When
an Italian prosecutor decides to charge CIA operatives for their
alleged participation in a black operation of kidnapping and
rendition, the law of the battlefield has shifted.
In the Kosovo campaign, news reports of collateral damage
often noted that coalition pilots could have improved their
technical accuracy by flying lower-although this would have
exposed their planes and pilots to more risk. The law of armed
conflict does not require you to fly low or take more risk to avoid
collateral damage-it requires you to avoid superfluous injury
and unnecessary suffering. But these news reports changed the
legal context-it seemed "unfair." Humanitarians seized the
moment--developing various theories to demand "feasible
compliance"-holding the military to technically achievable
levels of care. In conference after conference, negotiation after
negotiation, representatives of the U.S. military have argued
that this is simply not "the law." Perhaps not-but the effect of
the legal claim on the political context for military action is hard
to deny.
As a result, strange as it may seem, there is now more than
one set of laws of armed conflict. Different nations-even in the
same coalition-will have signed onto different treaties. The
same standards look different if you anticipate battle against a
technologically superior foe-or live in a Palestinian refugee
[Vol. 16:2
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camp in Gaza. Although we might disagree with one or the
other interpretation, we must recognize that the legal materials
are elastic enough to enable diverse interpretations. Amnesty
International called Israeli attacks on Hezbollah "war crimes
that give rise to individual criminal responsibility." Israel
rejected the charge that it "acted outside international norms or
international legality" and insisted that "you are legally entitled
to target infrastructure that your enemy is exploiting for its
military campaign." Who will judge?
In the United States, the Supreme Court-or the ballot
box-might be the final arbiter. Does Guantanamo violate the
law in war or is it, in fact, a legitimate exercise of the
President's war power? Should the justices of the Supreme
Court rule, they will have the final word. If they do not, there is
always another election.
On the international stage, there is only the Court of World
Public Opinion. As a lawyer, advising the military about the
law of war means making a prediction about how people with
the power to influence our success will interpret the legitimacy
of our plans. What will our allies or our own citizenry say? If
we will need the cooperation of citizens in Iraq, Lebanon, or
Pakistan, what will they have to say? We have seen the cost in
political legitimacy and international cooperation that comes
when we play by rules others do not recognize.
OPPORTUNITIES-FOR HUMANITARIANS AND MILITARY
PROFESSIONALS
It is easy to understand the virtues of a powerful legal
vocabulary, shared by elites around the world, for judging the
violence of warfare. It is exciting to see law become the mark of
legitimacy as legitimacy has become the currency of power.
It is more difficult to see the opportunities this opens for the
military professional to harness law as a weapon, or to
understand the dark sides of war by law. But the humanist
vocabulary of international law is routinely mobilized as a
strategic asset in war. The American military has coined a word
for this: "lawfare"-law as a weapon, law as a tactical ally, law
as a strategic asset, an instrument of war.
Law can often accomplish whdt we might once have done
with bombs and missiles: seize and secure territory, send
messages about resolve and political seriousness, and even
20071
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break the will of a political opponent. When the military buys
up commercial satellite capacity to deny it to an adversary-
contract is their weapon. They could presumably have denied
their adversary access to those pictures in many ways. When
the United States uses the Security Council to certify lists of
terrorists and force seizure of their assets abroad, they have
weaponized the law. Those assets might also have been
immobilized in other ways.
It is not only the use of force that can do these things.
Threats can sometimes work. And law often marks the line
between what counts as the routine exercise of one's prerogative
and a threat to cross that line and exact a penalty.
This will take some getting used to. How should we feel
when the military "legally conditions the battlefield" by
informing the public that they are entitled to kill civilians, or
when our political leadership justifies warfare in the language
of human rights?
We need to remember what it means to say that compliance
with international law "legitimates." It means, of course, that
killing, maiming, humiliating, or wounding people is legally
privileged, authorized, permitted, and justified.
In 1996, I traveled to Senegal as a civilian instructor with
the Naval Justice School to train members of the Senegalese
military in the laws of war and human rights. At the time, the
U.S. military was the world's largest human rights training
institution, operating in 53 countries, from Albania to
Zimbabwe. As I recall it, our training message was clear:
humanitarian law is not a way of being nice. Compliance will
make your force interoperable with international coalitions,
suitable for international peacekeeping missions. To work with
us and use our weapons, your military culture must have
parallel rules of operation and engagement to our own.
Most importantly, we insisted, humanitarian law will make
your military more effective-something you can sustain and
proudly stand behind. There is something chilling here-what
does it mean to build a culture of violence one can "proudly
stand behind?"
When we broke into small groups for simulated exercises, a
regional commander asked "when you capture some guerrillas,
isn't it better to place a guy's head on a stake for deterrence?"
Well, no, we patiently explained-this will strengthen the
hostility of villagers to your troops-and imagine what would
[Vol. 16:2
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happen if CNN were nearby. They all laughed-of course, we
would be sure to keep the press away. Ah, we said, but this is
no longer possible.
If you want to play on the international stage, you need to
be ready to have CNN constantly by your side. You must place
an imaginary CNN webcam on your helmet, or, better, just over
your shoulder. Not because force must be limited and not
because CNN might show up-but because only force which can
imagine itself being seen can be enduring. An act of violence
one can disclose and be proud of is ultimately stronger, more
legitimate. Indeed, we might imagine calculating a CNN-effect,
in which the additional opprobrium resulting from civilian
deaths, discounted by the probability of it becoming known to
relevant audiences, multiplied by the ability of that audience to
hinder the continued prosecution of the war, will need to be
added to the probable costs of the strike in calculating its
proportionality and necessity-as well as its tactical value and
strategic consequences.
Law reminds the military professional of the landscape, and
of the views, powers, and vulnerabilities of all those who might
influence the space of battle. Law frames the strategic question
this way: who, understanding the law in what way, will be able
to do what to affect our ongoing efforts? How, using what mix of
behavior and assertion, can we transform the strategic situation
to our advantage? These questions cannot be answered by a
code of conduct. They require a complex social analysis of the
dynamic interaction between ideas about the law and strategic
objectives.
Not all military professionals think of the law in these
terms-many are suspicious about embracing law as a strategic
partner. When I was in corporate practice, I often saw the same
suspicion among businessmen. Law, they said, was too rigid,
looked back rather than forward. In their eyes, law was
basically a bunch of rules and prohibitions-you figure out what
you want to achieve, and then, if you have time, you can ask the
lawyers to vet it to be sure no one gets in trouble.
But these businessmen were not getting all they could from
their legal counsel. Neither are military commanders-or
Presidents-who think of law as a set of formal limits to be
gotten around. What is difficult for us to realize is that a war
machine which uses law more strategically might, in fact, be far
more violent, more powerful, more legitimate.
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Imagine a businessman contemplating a potential deal.
Figuring out what law will govern the transaction requires a
complex assessment of national and local laws and private
arrangements, in whatever jurisdictions might seek to have-or
simply turn out to have-transnational effects on the business.
A good corporate lawyer will assess the impact of many legal
regimes-who will want to regulate the transaction? Who will
be able to do so? What rules will influence the transaction even
absent enforcement?
Savvy clients do not treat the law as static-they influence
it. They forum shop. They structure their transactions to place
income here, risks there. They internalize national regulations
to shield themselves from liability. They lobby, they bargain for
exceptions. Like businessmen, military planners routinely use
the legal maps proactively to shape operations. When fighter
jets scoot along a coastline, build to a package over friendly
territory before crossing into hostile airspace, they are using the
law strategically-as a shield, marker of safe and unsafe.
We know that corporations often lobby hard to be regulated.
The food and drug industry wants federal safety standards-to
legitimate their products, defend against price competition from
start-ups who do not invest in long term brand reputation, and
to shield themselves from liability. They want to be able to
claim-we complied with all applicable legal regulations, and if
you died anyway, it is not our responsibility. Sometime parallel
goes on for the military.
AND IT IS HERE THAT WE CAN BEGIN TO SEE THE
DARKER SIDE OF MODERN WAR AND MODERN LAW
The role of American lawyers assessing the Bush
administration's approach to the treatment of detainees
illustrates the difficulties. I confess I shuddered when I read
the legal memoranda provided to our civilian and military
leadership by the lawyers at the justice department. However
tightly reasoned their conclusions, this was legal advice tone
deaf to consequences and strategic possibilities. The inattention
to reaction, persuasion, strategy and to the world of legal
pluralism and asymmetric warfare was astonishing. Our best
legal minds had analyzed the legality of the President's
proposed course of action as if this were something one could
look up in a text and interpret with confidence. But we know
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that what can be done with words on paper can but rarely be
done in the world of real politics and war. Politics and warfare
are an altogether different medium for writing. It is altogether
the legal advisor's task to assess risks and reactions.
In the meantime, we have all learned how to argue for a
stricter reading of international law. "Common Article 3" of the
Geneva Conventions has been all over the news. We hear
arguments for a stricter reading rooted in ethics, in the
practicalities of interrogation, in the requirements of an
effective public diplomacy. Were I the judge, I have no doubt
how I would rule-but in the international system there is no
judge. Or we are all judges. In such a world, I hope the
President's counsel considered the impact on discipline in our
own forces of announcing so permissive an interpretation of
what might be done in secret, off the map. Or the effect on our
enemies, our allies, ourselves, of insisting so doggedly on our
prerogatives. How did our assertions communicate American
power?
Of course people will be detained and interrogated in war.
That there might be those on the battlefield who were neither
privileged enemy combatants nor protected civilians has long
been recognized. But what was our strategy in marking these
detainees with a neologism-illegal combatant-flagging what
we were doing as exceptional, extraordinary, new? Was it
sensible to place such diverse detainees in a common legal
status? Could our lawyers have helped us build a bridge
between the criminal justice system and warfare-rather than a
wall separating this conflict from the resources and habitual
practices of each? Might they have used the problems of
detention and interrogation to link offense abroad with defense
at home-rather than stressing the sui generis nature of all that
we do?
The best corporate lawyers help their clients look forward to
the next step-when we have gotten you into this deal, how will
we get you out? What will happen when it goes wrong-what if
the regulators do not buy it, what if the rules change, what if
the business climate changes and you change your own mind
about what to do?
Did the lawyers crafting our war on terror worry about how
we would unbuild Guantanamo, get these people out of this
status?
I am afraid they worried more about establishing principles
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of authority and limits to legality than about the war their
client was starting to fight. They strategized for the law-and
for their ideas and legal theories about the President's
authority-but not for the nation. Of course, maybe they told
their client what he wanted to hear-and perhaps he has offered
the American public the war they wanted to fight. But we know
that statesmen-and military commanders-can find
themselves trapped in a bubble. So do businessmen.
At its best, the law can be a great strategic mirror. How
will this deal, this battle, this campaign, look in the eyes of the
other? To think strategically is to treat the law as an index of
reactions-predictions, in Holmes' famous formulation, of "what
the courts will decide in fact, and nothing more pretentious." It
is far too soon to know what the court of public opinion, at home
and abroad, will ultimately make of our strategy for the war on
terror, and how that opinion will be translated into political
power. My worry is that meanwhile, our nations' lawyers-and
judges-have been asleep at the wheel.
But the dangers inherent in the modem partnership of war
and law go beyond bad lawyering. More significant, to my mind,
is the loss of critical distance on the violence of war. As we all
know, the UN Charter prohibited the use of force-except as
authorized by the Charter itself. Not as authorized by the UN,
but as authorized by the Charter. Like a constitution, the
Charter was drafted in broad strokes and would need to be
interpreted. Over the years, what began as an effort to
monopolize force has become a constitutional regime of
legitimate justifications for warfare.
This system of principles has legitimated a great deal of
warfare. Indeed, it is hard to think of a use of force that could
not be legitimated in the language of the Charter. It is a rare
statesman who launches a war simply to be aggressive. There is
almost always something else to be said-the province is
actually ours, our rights have been violated, our enemy is not, in
fact, a state, we were invited to help, they were about to attack
us, we are promoting the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. Something.
A parallel process has eroded the firewall between civilian
and military targets-it is but a short step to what the military
terms "effects based targeting." And why shouldn't military
operations be judged by their effects, rather than by their
adherence to narrow rules that might well have all manner of
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perverse and unpredictable outcomes?
Indeed, I was struck during the NATO bombardment of
Belgrade-justified by the international community's
humanitarian objectives in Kosovo-to hear discussions about
targeting the civilian elites supporting the Milosevic regime. If
bombing the bourgeoisie would have been more effective than a
long march inland toward the capital, would it have been
proportional, necessary-humanitarian-to place the war's
burden on young draftees in the field rather than upon the
civilian population who sent them there? Might not targeting
civilians supporting an outlaw-if democratic-regime extend
the Nuremberg principle of individual responsibility?
We must recognize that humanitarian idealism no longer
provides a standpoint outside the ebbs and flows of political and
strategic debate about how to achieve our objectives on the
battlefield.
Conversing before the court of world public opinion,
statesmen not only assert their prerogatives-they also test and
establish those prerogatives through action. Political assertions
come armed with little packets of legal legitimacy-just as legal
assertions carry a small backpack of political corroboration. As
lawyers must harness enforcement to their norms, states must
defend their prerogatives to keep them-must back up their
assertions with action to maintain their credibility. A great
many military campaigns have been undertaken for just this
kind of credibility-missiles become missives.
The pragmatic assessment of wartime violence can be
deeply disturbing. Take civilian casualties. Of course, civilians
will be killed in war. Limiting civilian death has become a
pragmatic commitment-no unnecessary damage, not one more
civilian than necessary. In the vernacular of humanitarian law,
no "superfluous injury," and no "unnecessary suffering." It is
here that we find the military's public affairs teams preparing
the way by explaining that they are entitled to kill-and expect
to kill-civilians.
You may remember Major General James Mattis, poised to
invade Falluja, concluding his demand that the insurgents
stand down with these words: "We will always be humanitarian
in all our efforts. We will fight the enemy on our terms. May
God help them when we're done with them." I know I shivered
at his juxtaposition of humanitarian claims and blunt threats.
We need to understand how this sounds-particularly when
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the law of armed conflict has so often been a vocabulary used by
the rich to judge the poor. When the Iraqi insurgent quoted on
the same page of the New York Times as Mattis threatened to
decapitate civilian hostages if the coalition forces did not
withdraw, he was also threatening innocent civilian death-less
of it actually-but without the humanitarian promise. And, of
course, he also made me shiver.
When the poor deviate from the best military practices of
the rich, it is tempting to treat their entire campaign as
illegitimate. But before we jump to the legitimacy of their
cause, how should we evaluate the strategic use of perfidy by
every outgunned insurgency battling a modern occupation
army? That evaluation forces us to encounter the different ways
these statements are received by all the publics with the
capacity to influence the military operations.
From an "effects-based" perspective, perfidious attacks on
our military-from mosques, by insurgents dressing as civilians
or using human shields-may have more humanitarian
consequences than any number of alternative tactics the
insurgents may have used. Perhaps more importantly, they are
very likely to be interpreted by many as reasonable responses by
a massively outgunned, but legitimate, force. Indeed, even our
own troops typically respond in at least two registers. In the
first, it is all perfidy-the insurgents are barely recognizable as
human, understand only force, know no boundaries. But we
also find a common recognition that, as one soldier put it, "what
would I do if this were my town? How would I fight-probably
just as they are now."
I am often asked how today's wars can be seen as "legal"
when our opponents, the terrorists, respect no laws at all. Of
course, the role law will play in our own campaign will be a
function of our own values and our own strategy. But the
surprising thing is the extent to which even opponents in today's
asymmetric conflicts argue about tactics in a parallel
vernacular-in Lebanon, everyone was citing UN resolutions
and claiming their tactics were proportional, their opponents'
perfidious. We should not be surprised to find various
Palestinian factions differentiated by their interpretation of
legitimate targets-Israeli civilians or only soldiers, in the
territories or in Israel proper, and so forth.
We will need to become more adept at operations in a world
in which the image of a single dead civilian can make out a
[Vol. 16:2
MODERN WAR AND MODERN LAW
persuasive case that law has been violated-a case that trumps
the most ponderous technical legal defense. At the same time,
the legitimacy of wartime violence is all mixed up with the
legitimacy of the war itself. If the use of force is to be
proportional-more force for more important objectives-it
seems reasonable to think there would be a sliding scale for
more and less important wars. Wars for national survival, wars
to stop genocide-shouldn't they legitimate more than run-of-
the-mill efforts to enforce UN resolutions? There can be
something perverse here-harsher tactics more legitimate in
more "humanitarian" campaigns.
It is in this atmosphere that discipline has broken down in
every asymmetric struggle, when neither clear rules nor broad
standards of judgment seem adequate to moor one's ethical
sense of responsibility and empowerment.
In self-defense, we grant the most permissive rules of
engagement. You hear about navy pilots briefed on all the
technical rules of engagement, and then sent off with the
empowering and permissive words "just don't get killed out
there-defend yourselves, do what's necessary." At the same
time, all sides assess their adversaries by the strictest
standards.
Technological asymmetry and legal pluralism leave
everyone uncertain what, if any, rules apply to their own
situation. Everyone has a CNN camera on their shoulder-but
who is watching-the enemy, the civilians, your family at home,
your commanding officer, your buddies?
Soldiers, civilians, media commentators, and politicians all
begin to lose their ethical moorings. We can surely see that it
will be hard for any Iraqi--or Lebanese-mother to feel it was
necessary and proportional to kill her son. "Why," she might
well demand to know, "when America is so powerful and strong
did you need to kill my husband?"
Here we can begin to see the dangers in turning the old
distinction between combatants and civilians into a principle.
But what can it mean for the distinction between military and
civilian to have itself become a principle? The "principle of
distinction"-there is something oxymoronic here-either it is a
distinction, or it is a principle.
I have learned that if you ask a military professional-
precisely how many civilians can you kill to offset how much
risk to one of your own men?-you won't receive a straight
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answer. Indeed, at least so far as I have been able to ascertain,
there is no background exchange rate for civilian life. What you
find instead are rules kicking the decision up the chain of
command as the number of civilians increases, until the decision
moves offstage from military professionals to politicians. You
expect more than 50 civilian casualties? Cheney's office needs to
be informed.
As the law in war became a matter of standards, balancing,
and pragmatic calculation, the difficult, discretionary decisions
were exported to the political realm. But when they get there,
they find politicians seeking cover beneath the same legal
formulations. Judgment, leadership, and responsibility are in
short supply.
In the early days of the Iraq war, coalition forces were
certainly frustrated by Iraqi soldiers who advanced in the
company of civilians. A Corporal Mikael McIntosh reported that
he and a colleague had declined several times to shoot soldiers
in fear of harming civilians. "It's a judgment call." He said, "If
the risks outweigh the losses, then you don't take the shot." He
offered an example: "There was one Iraqi soldier, and 25 women
and children, I didn't take the shot." His colleague, Sergeant
Eric Schrumpf chipped in to describe facing one soldier among
two or three civilians, opening fire, and killing civilians: "We
dropped a few civilians, but what do you do. I'm sorry, but the
chick was in the way."
There is no avoiding decisions of this type in warfare. The
difficulty arises when humanitarian law transforms decisions
about whom to kill into judgments. When it encourages us to
think the "chick's" death resulted not from an exercise of human
freedom, for which a moral being is responsible, but rather from
the abstract operation of professional principles.
We know there are clear cases both ways-destroying the
village to save it, or minor accidental damage en route to
victory-but we also know that the principles are most
significant in the great run of situations that fall in between.
What does it mean to pretend these decisions are principled
judgments? It can mean a loss of the experience of
responsibility-command responsibility, ethical responsibility,
and political responsibility.
I was struck that Iraq war reporting was filled with
anecdotes about soldiers overcome by remorse at having
slaughtered civilians-and being counseled back to duty by their
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officers, their chaplains, or their mental health professionals,
who explained that what they had done was necessary and
proportional and, therefore, just.
Of course, if you ask leading humanitarian law experts how
many civilians you can kill for this or that, you will also not get
an answer. Rather than saying "it's a judgment call," however,
they are likely to say something like "you just can't target
civilians"--thereby refusing to engage in the pragmatic
assessments necessary to make that rule applicable in combat.
In psychological terms, it is hard to avoid interpreting this
pragmatism-promised-but-not-delivered as anything other than
denial; a collaborative denial-by humanitarians and military
lawyers--of their responsibility for the decisions inherent in
war. Indeed, the greatest threat posed by the merger of law and
war is loss of the human experience of moral jeopardy in the
face of death, mutilation and all the other horrors of warfare.
Whatever happened was legitimate, proportional, and
necessary. Wherever responsibility lies-it lies elsewhere.
With the civilian command, with the bad apples among the
troops, with the peregrinations of an ineffective diplomacy, or
with the enemy, with the enemies of civilization itself.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude. War has become a legal institution. Law
has become a flexible strategic instrument for military and
humanitarian professionals alike. As such, law may do more to
legitimate than restrain violence. It may accelerate the vertigo
of combat and contribute to the loss of ethical moorings for
people on all sides of a conflict. We modernized the law of war
to hold those who use violence politically responsible. That is
why we applaud law as a global vernacular of "legitimacy."
Unfortunately, however, the experience of political
responsibility for war has proven elusive. Recapturing a politics
of war would mean feeling the weight of the decision to kill or
let live. Most professionals flee from this experience. But
citizens flee from this experience as well. We have all become
adept in the language of war and law. We all yearn for the
reassurance of an external judgment-by political leaders,
clergy, lawyers, and others-that what we have gotten in to is,
in fact, ethically responsible national politics.
In a sense, the commander who offloads responsibility for
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warfare to the civilian leadership is no different than the foot
soldier who blames the officers, the lawyer who fault the rules,
or the citizen who repeats what he heard on the evening news.
Clausewitz was right-war is the continuation of political
intercourse. When we make war, humanitarian and military
professionals together, let us experience politics as our vocation
and responsibility as our fate.
Thank you-I look forward to your comments.
